Peti ti on of Williams/Newcorp Generating Company, pursuant to 220 C.M.R. § 8.07(2), for relief from the actions of Boston Edison Company in connection with BECo's RFP 3.

APPEARANCES: Di edre I. Lawrence, Esq.

Rubi n and Rudman 50 Rowes Wharf

Boston, Massachusetts 02110 FOR: WILLIAMS/NEWCORP

GENERATING COMPANY

Peti ti oner

Douglas S. Horan, Esq.
Catheri ne J. Keuthen, Esq.
Neven Rabadji ja, Esq.
Wi IIi am S. Stowe, Esq.
800 Boylston Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02199
FOR: BOSTON EDI SON COMPANY
Respondent

L. Scott Harshbarger, Esq.
By: Jerrold Oppenhei m, Esq.
Assi stant Attorney General
Regulated Industri es Di vi si on
131 Tremont Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02111
Intervenor

Davi d S. Rosenzwei g, Esq.
Keohane & Keegan
21 Custom House Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
FOR: ALTRESCO FINANCIAL, INC.
Li mi ted Parti ci pant

I. INTRODUCTION

A. <u>Procedural Hi story</u>

On January 31, 1992, Williams/Newcorp Generating Company ("Williams"), submitted a project proposal in Boston Edison Company's ("BECo's" or "Company's") third request for proposals ("RFP 3") from non-utility generators ("NUGs"). On June 10, 1992, Williams filed a petition ('Petition') with the Department of Public Utilities ('Department'), pursuant to 220 C.M.R. § 8.07(2). The Petition asked the Department that BECo in appropriately adjusted Williams' self-score of its proposal, and to require BECo to begin contract negotiations with Williams as a member of the RFP3 award group (Petition at 10). The Petitional Leges that BECo in appropriately scored Williams' bid, reducing its total points in the evaluation process. Williams asserts that BECo should not have scored Williams' project as it did because (1) Williams followed BECo's instructions using 8,760 period hours in calculating its price score, (2) Williams' proposal is reasonable within the meaning of RFP3 and the Department's regulations and precedent, and (3) BECo improperly used unpublished criteria to score Williams' project (id. at 3, 5, and 7).

On June 24, 1992, Altresco Fi nancial, Inc. ("Altresco") fi led a petition for leave to intervene in this docket. On July 2, 1992, Williams filed a supplement to its Petition, together with a memorandum of law and an affidavit of Brian Williams, both supporting its

Williams proposed to sell output from a 25 megawatt ("MW) combusti on turbi ne peaking unit.

Williams refers to BECo's adjustments to Williams' self-score as "BECo's rescoring."

Altresco submitted a proposal in response to RFP3 to sell power from a 132 MW from a proposed natural gas-fired combined cycle unitin Lynn, Massachusetts.

Peti ti on. On July 10, 1992, the Department i ssued an Order of Noti ce that (1) set July 15, 1992 as the deadline to file a peti ti on for leave to intervene in this docket, (2) established requirements for filing an answer or response to Williams's petition, and (3) set July 24, 1992 as the date to file any such answer or response. On July 10, 1992, the Attorney General of the Commonwealth ("Attorney General") filed a notice of intervention pursuant to G.L. c. 12, § 11E. On July 15, 1992, CMS Generation Co. and Montvale Energy Associates, L.P. (jointly "CMS") filed a petition for leave to intervene. On July 23, 1992, the Hearing Officer is sued a ruling (1) denying the petition to intervene of Altresco, (2) granting Altresco limited participant status to address the legal issues raised in this docket, and (3) denying the petition of CMS to intervene in this case.

On July 24, 1992, BECo filed its answer ("BECo Answer") to Williams Petition, accompanied by a memorandum in opposition to Williams Petition ("BECo Memorandum") and affidavits by William P. Killgoar ("Killgoar Affidavit") and John J. Reed. On July 24, 1992, Altresco filed an answer in support of BECo's rescoring of Williams proposal ("Altresco Answer"). On July 30, 1992, the Hearing Officer is sued a notice that Williams

⁴ CMS also submitted a proposal in RFP 3.

Also on July 24, 1992, Altrescofiled a motion for summary judgment. On July 28, 1992, Altresco appealed to the full Commission the Hearing Officer's July 23, 1992, ruling denying Altresco's petition to intervene. On July 31, 1992, Williams filed a motion to strike portions of the Altresco Answer and an Opposition to Altresco's motion for summary judgment. Altresco responded on August 5, 1992 to Williams' opposition to Altresco's appeal of the Hearing Officer's ruling and on August 7, 1992 to Williams' motion to strike. Because of the Department's disposition of this case, the Department need not rule on these motions or the appeal of the Hearing Officer ruling. We make no further findings regarding Altresco's status as a party or limited participant in this proceeding. Moreover, in light of our decision to reject the subject Petition, we expressly do not reach the issue of whether limited participants may file motions for summary judgment.

could respond to BECo's Answer no later than August 6, 1992. On August 6, 1992, Williams filed a response to BECo's Answer and Altresco's Answer, accompanied by an affidavit of Daniel Lupfer ("Lupfer Affidavit").

B. Background on BECo's RFP 3

Pursuant to approval by the Department, BECo i ssued i ts RFP 3 on October 11, 1991. By January 31, 1992, the response deadline for proposals in RFP 3, BECo received 41 project proposals for a total of 3,300 MW.

On May 20, 1992, BECo petitioned the Department to defer further activities in RFP 3 to its first integrated resource management ("I NM") proceeding, and in particular to defer announcing the award group and negotiating purchased power contracts with award group members. On June 1, 1992, BECo announced that it had selected the Altresco Lynn project proposal as the sole member of the RFP 3 award group. On June 2, 1992, the Department ordered BECo to announce the award group but granted a temporary stay of BECo's obligation to negotiate and execute a purchase power contract with the RFP 3 award group. Boston Edison Company, D.P.U. 90-130-1, at 11, 13 (1992). During the following

As i ssued, BECo's RFP3 provi ded for a tentati ve supply block within the range of 132 MW to 306 MW. <u>Boston Edi son Company</u>, D.P.U. 90-270, at 35 (1991). The Department Later set the size of the final supply block at 132 MW. <u>Boston Edi son Company</u>, D.P.U. 90-270-C at 4 (1992).

On July 24, 1992, the Attorney General filed a letter in this docket that recommended that BECo's "RFP3 bidders submit new bids relying on (after Commission review) updated BECo avoided costs." The issue regarding the filing of new bids with updated cost information was resolved by the Department's recent decision in Boston Edison Company, D.P.U. 92-130 (1993), by requiring BECo to negotiate with the award group based on the existing project proposals.

month, Williams and three other project sponsors submitted petitions to the Department, generally claiming that their bids were improperly scored, thereby challenging BECo's designation of Altresco as the sole award group member. In addition, two other project sponsors filed petitions with the Department because of BECo's decision to disqualify their bids.

On June 25, 1993, the Department i ssued an Order denying BECo's May 20, 1992 petition to defer further activities in RFP 3. <u>Boston Edison Company</u>, D.P.U. 92-130 (1993). The Department required BECo to begin negotiating a purchase power contract with the RFP3 award group, but suspended BECo's obligation to execute a contract with the RFP3 award group until the Department issues final orders in the proceedings involving challenges to the rankings in BECo's RFP 3. Id. at 33-34.

On June 30, 1993, BECo filed with the Department a motion for immediate stay of the Department's June 25, 1993 Order in D.P.U. 92-130. In an Order dated July 14, 1993, the Department denied this motion. Boston Edison Company, D.P.U. 90-130-A (1993). Also on July 14, 1993, BECo filed an appeal of the Department's June 25, 1993 Order with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Department's regulations governing the purchase of power from NUGs state that

The three other proceedings regarding allegations of improper scoring are <u>CMS</u> Generating Company and Montvale Energy Associates, L.P., D.P.U. 92-166; <u>Bio Development Corporation</u>, D.P.U. 92-167; and <u>Concord Energy Corporation</u>, D.P.U. 92-144.

The two proceedings regarding disquali fied bidders were <u>DLS Energy, Inc.</u>, D.P.U. 92-153, and <u>West Lynn Cogeneration</u>, D.P.U. 92-142. West Lynn Cogeneration has since withdrawn its petition.

if, "at any time, a qualifying facility is aggrieved by an action of a utility pursuant to these regulations, the qualifying facility may petition the Department to investigate such action." 220 C.M.R. § 8.07(2). In review in gany petition filed pursuant to 220 C.M.R. § 8.07(2), the Department applies a standard of "reasonableness." In Riverside Steam and Electric Company, D.P.U. 88-123, at 19-20 (1988), the Department stated

In revi ewing the utility's actions, the Department will not substitute its own judgment for that of the utility solong as there is a reasonable basis for the utility's actions. Thus the Department will impose appropriate remedies only if it finds that, given what the utility knew or should have known at the time, its actions had no reasonable basis. Under 220 C.M.R. § 8.07(2), the burden of proof is on the aggrieved OF [qualifying facility].

Id. at 20; see also Destec Energy et al., D.P.U. 92-46, at 4-5 (1992) ("Destec"); EUA

Power Corporation, D.P.U. 92-38, at 5 (1992); Ri versi de Steam and Electric Company,

D.P.U. 88-123-B at 7, 50 (1991); and Boston Edi son Company, D.P.U. 88-158, at 23

(1990).

Furthermore, the Department has recognized that in the management of its request for proposals ("RFP") process, an electric company is allowed a measure of discretion:

[I]n matters concerning an approved RFP, the Department wi II allow an electric company a measure of discretion in administering and managing the RFP process. Allowing a measure of discretion at this stage in the RFP process is appropriate in Ii ght of the Department's regulations [220 C.M.R. § 8.00 et seq.] governing other stages of the RFP process where explicit requirements for the content of an RFP and the solicitation and contracting processes are evident.

<u>Destec</u> at 13. In <u>Destec</u>, the Department reaffirmed its position that electricutility companies may use discretion in implementing the instructions and requirements of an RFP, but also indicated that an electric company must administer its RFP in a manner that prevents favoritism and treats all project sponsors equitably. <u>Id.</u> at 13-14.

Additionally, the Department must endeavor to ensure that an electric company's scoring system is applied in a manner that maximizes net benefits to ratepayers. See 20 C.M.R.§ 8.05(5)(c). Therefore, in assessing the reasonableness of BECo's application of its scoring system, the Department will consider whether a scoring decision appropriately recognizes the actual benefits that a proposed project offers ratepayers.

III. RESCORING ISSUE

A. Introduction

BECo's RFP3, as approved by the Department, provi des that a "Sponsor's Pri ce Bi d may be compri sed of \$/KW-YR [\$/ki lowatt-year] or ¢/Kwh [cents per ki lowatt-hour] rates, however, the use of \$/KW-YR rate is reserved for Di spatchable Faci li ti es" (BECo RFP3, at A-2). RFP3 provi des that

\$\frac{\kW-YR or \kwww \kww \kww \kwww \kwww \kwww \kwww \kwww \kwww \kwww \kwww \kwww \kw

$$C/kWh = \frac{(\$/KW/Year)}{Peri od Hours \(0.90 \)} \times 100$$

(i d. at A-4 and A-5).

Williams proposed a unit that would be available to the Company only 1,500 hours per year, with a price that was fixed and would be paid in \$/KWonly, including all fuel costs (Petition at 2, 4; BECo Memorandum at 9). BECo reduced Williams' claimed price score by 77.8 points by recalculating Williams' score using 1,500 hours per year as the Period Hours in the above formula, instead of the 8,760 hours that Williams had used in scoring itself (BECo Memorandum at 9-11, 13).

B. Positions of the Parties

1. Williams

Williams states that its project proposal contained a fixed \$\text{KWcharge}\$ without a variable fuel charge, since its gas supply contract is a take-or-pay contract, which includes gas transportation but imposes no variable fuel costs on the project (Petition at 2, 7).

Williams claims that pursuant to instructions that it received from BECo¹⁰ it calculated its price score by dividing the annual equivalent of its proposed fixed charge by 7,884 hours per year (90 percent of all 8,760 hours in the year) to arrive at a \$\(\text{KWH}\) price (id. at 2).

Williams contends that, in following the requirements established in NFP3 and in the subsequent correspondence from BECo (the December 30 Letter), Williams was entitled to the price score it claimed (i.d. at 45). Williams argues that it followed BECo's instructions in the December 30 Letter and divided the annual equivalent of its bid fixed charge (\$\forall KW) yr) by the Period Hours, which that same letter defined to be 8,760 hours in a year, multiplied by a 90 percent EAF (i.d. at 2). Williams asserts that BECo, in effect, declared its own scoring formula incorrect after all bids were in, and then applied another, unpublished, price scoring formula to evaluate the bids (i.d. at 8-10). Moreover, Williams argues that by

The instructions are contained in a December 30, 1991 Letter ("December 30 Letter") from Paul Vaitkus of BECo to Daniel Lupfer of Place Associates, Williams' consultant (Petition, Exh. WM-2). BECo's December 30 Letter responded to a December 18, 1991 Letter from Mr. Lupfer, which had sought "a definition of 'Period Hours' in the denominator of the equation, ... as it pertains to a peaking facility" that may operate much less than 8,760 hours per year (Lupfer Affidavit, Exh. 2).

BECo's December 30 Letter replied that RFP3 requires that \$/KW-YR be converted into \$\psi/KWH using a 90 percent EAF "over an annual period (8760 hrs/yr).... All project proposals, regardless of operational mode, must use the 0.9 EAF and 8760 hours when converting from \$/kw-yr to \$\psi/kwh" (Petition, Exh. WM-2).

contracting for a fixed cost fuel supply, it would lower the risk to ratepayers of high fuel cost pass-throughs, which should result in a reward rather than a penalty in the project proposal scoring system (<u>id.</u> at 6).

2. BECo

BECoclaims that Williams, in its December 18 letter to BECo regarding calculation of the standard price score, failed to disclose (1) that it intended to recover its fuel and other variable costs through a fixed pricing mechanism, and (2) that its unithad a dispatch limitation (BECo Memorandum at 9-10). BECo further claims that Williams' failure to disclose this information affected the answer it provided Williams in the December 30 Letter (id. at 10). BECo claims that it rescored Williams' bid because when its scoring system was applied to the Williams project, the scoring system yielded a price score that bore no relation to the true economic value of the Williams project, since the actual annual payments from BECo to Williams would be 300 percent higher than the figure Williams used to calculate the Price Factor Score (id. at 9-10).

Therefore, BECo indicated that in order to match Williams' Price Factor score to the true economic value of the project, BECo reassessed Williams' Price Factor score using the actual payments (from Williams' proforma financial statement) which are consistent with 1,500 hours per year rather than 8,760 hours), resulting in a 77.8 scoring point reduction (i.d. at 9-11). Accordingly, BECo states that it reduced Williams price score by 77.8 points (Killgoar Affidavit, Attachment 7, at 3).

BECoalso claims that Williams's proposed facility is not dispatchable, since its operation is limited to 1,500 hours per year (BECo Memorandum at 11). Accordingly,

BECo contends Williams was not entitled to use the \$/KWrate that it in fact used, and BECo asserts use of the \$/KWrate itself would be grounds for disqualifying the bid (id.).

C. <u>Analysis and Findings</u>

The Department's QF regulations state:

[I] he ranki ng formula adopted by the utili ty must recognize continuous tradeoffs innet ratepayer benefits between various measurable criteria used to score Project Proposals. The ultimate goal of the utility's ranking formula must be to maximize net benefits to ratepayers.

220 C.M.R. § 8.05(5)(c).

The Department seeks to implement and oversee a solicitation process that treats project sponsors fairly and ensures that the interests of ratepayers are protected. The Department approved BECo's RFP3 with the important objective inmind of maximizing economic value to ratepayers.

Project economics are a critical part of a decision about which projects are selected for an award group. In our review of an RFP price scoring formula, the Department seeks to ensure that the economic value of each proposal will be reflected in the scoring process without imposing unduly rigid pricing criteria. The Department sought to ensure this result by approving the price provisions of BECo's RFP, including the provision that, for dispatchable projects, \$/KWprice bids would be converted to \$\psi/KWH\$ by dividing by the hours in the period.

The Department notes that Williams' scoring of its project appears to be consistent with the technical instructions set forth in BECo's December 30 Letter. However, the

We note that the Department approved RFP 3 but did not approve (nor need to approve) the December 30 Letter from BECo regarding application of RFP 3 instructions.

Department agrees with BECo that Williams' variable fuel cost price proposal of zero made Williams' use of 7,884 hours in the formula in appropriate, because it would not enable BECo to establish the true economic value of Williams' proposal. In light of this dilemma, BECo acted appropriately by (1) recognizing the actual effect of Williams' price proposal on ratepayers, and (2) adjusting Williams' score to reflect the true value of the project. Stated differently, it would have been unreasonable for BECo (1) to ignore the inconsistency between Williams' claimed price score and the actual payments from its proforma financial statement, and (2) to accept Williams' claimed price score, because it was not based on Williams' proposed period of operation, 1,500 hours per year. Accordingly, the Department finds that, given the circumstances and recognizing the actual benefits that the Williams project offers to ratepayers, Williams has not shown that BECo's adjustment to Williams' Price Factor score was unreasonable.

Regarding Williams argument that its bid lowers the risk to ratepayers of high fuel cost pass-throughs, Williams already has been rewarded in BECo's scoring system for lowering this risk, under "Price Formula Risk Allocation Score" (RFP3, Evaluation Sheet No. 6). Again, Williams has not shown that BECo's adjustment to Williams' Price Factor score was unreasonable.

While BECo asserts that the project is not dispatchable and therefore not entitled to use the subject scoring formula, the Department finds that the meaning of dispatchability in this case is open to interpretation. However, the meaning of dispatchability is not the real issue in this case. Bather, the issue is which application of the scoring price formula reflects the true economic value of the project.

IV. ORDER

Accordingly, after due noti ce and consideration, it is

ONDERED: That the petition of Williams/Newcorp Generating Company filed with the Department on June 10, 1992 be and hereby is DENIED.

By Order of the Department,